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ABSTRACT
Tittle of Dissertation:

Cyber-Attacks; A Digital Threat Reality Affecting The
Maritime Industry

Degree:

Mater of Science

In recent decades, technology has developed impressively; the maritime industry sector is
one user of numerous new systems/equipment. This technological advance represents a
considerable advantage in terms of commercial, operational and financial benefit; on the
other hand, it also poses a significant risk for the security of the operations involved,
highlighting that the use of the new technological systems and equipment brings to the
table a series of threats that are affecting the maritime industry.
The importance of cybersecurity issues has been recognized up to a certain extent in recent
years. This research presents the most significant cases of cyber-attacks in the maritime
industry since 2011, covering, vessels, ports, shipping companies and maritime
administrations’ systems. It shows that the maritime industry is neither immune to cyberattacks nor completely prepared to combat the risks involved in using modern digital
systems. Such risks, if realized, can jeopardize the information, data and systems involved.
Nevertheless, confidentiality, integrity and availability are imperative for vessel security
operations, but also for shipping companies, ports and maritime administration operations
due to the enormous amount of sensitive information and money that is involved in each
activity.
This research effort also includes an overview of the current mitigation guidance
developed by International Maritime Organization and the maritime industry with a
review of the existing practices implemented by shipping companies and flag
administrations. Possible consequences and cyber-attacks in terms of safety, environment
and economy are discussed. Finally, conclusions and recommendations are presented,
highlighting the necessity for stakeholders in the maritime industry to be aware of the
current cybersecurity situations, and develop pertinent strategies to address cybersecurity
issues and the use of modern system.
KEYWORDS: Cybersecurity, Cyberattacks, Safety, Security, Threats, Risks,
Vulnerability,
Consequences.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background
The world is relying more on technology than ever before. Numerous applications of
technology have become a fundamental part of shipping, providing real information and
effective communication around the world, instantaneously. Digital technology has
advanced and increased exponentially in recent years; information technology (IT) and
operational technology (OT) are more frequently connected to the world wide web than
ever before, and the shipping industry cannot escape this reality (IMO, 2018). However,
technology is also bringing along certain risks regarding safety and security of shipping
operations that could possibly spill over to the economic domain, considering that both
information technology and operational technology are essential for the daily operation
and the sustainability of the shipping industry. The fact that more than 90 per cent of world
trade is carried by the shipping industry demonstrates that the industry is a critical factor
in the world economy, where intermodal freight transportation and integrated systems play
an essential role. At the same time, these systems are very vulnerable to cyber-attacks
(Saul, 2017).
The risk of cyber-attacks expanded exponentially at the end of the twentieth century, with
the arrival of the Internet, the use of computer networks systems and the emergence of
cyberspace as the basis of business. Cyber-attacks refer to the deliberate exploitation of
computer systems using malicious code to disturb computers and data. Cyber-pirates,
hackers, cyber-criminals, hacktivists and industrial competitors, motivated by monetary
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or other benefits, obtain access and control of a targets’ system to cause damage for
criminal or terrorist purposes. As already pointed out, accessing delicate systems and
using maritime transportation for unscrupulous acts can compromise the safety and
security of shipping operations (DiRenzo, 2017).
Digitalization is the conversion to digital technology of everything that is used in everyday
life, and the use of this technology is currently a point of discussion. The investment and
improvement that the maritime sector has experienced in the last decade are incredible,
revolutionizing transportation and creating numerous business opportunities.

Many

companies, such as Maersk and IBM are on the way to commercialising blockchain
technology to expand on the digital global trade platform (Maersk, 2018). Google and
Rolls Royce are studying and carrying out projects on autonomous shipping and intelligent
systems (Rolls-Royce, 2017). Det Norske Veritas and Germanischer Lloyd (DNV GL)
and Kongsberg are promoting the introduction of a digital platform for type approval
programme on cybersecurity (Kongsberg, 2017) and Inmarsat is continually expanding
the security services it provides (Inmarsat, 2017). Concerning the vessel operational
perspective, technology can help to maintain safe navigation, reduction of manning, as
well as secure and effective vessel operations.
The fourth industrial revolution brings to the stage, more means exposed to cyber-attacks,
than ever before, raising cyber risks in term of connectivity (see figure 1). Nonetheless, in
the interconnected shipping industry, where new technology applications and digital
systems are continually evolving, the operational time and effectiveness of each process
is essential for business transactions. It is necessary to point out that the development of
cybersecurity measures goes hand in hand with advancements in technology. However,
there is still a lack of understanding related to complex cybersecurity issues and the future
challenges that companies will face concerning cyber-attacks. It is indispensable to
consider that the human factor plays a fundamental role in the effectiveness of the attacks
as a significant vulnerability element for companies. According to a maritime survey
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carried out in 2016 by HIS Fairplay in association with Baltic and International Maritime
Council (BIMCO), malware represents 77 percent of all maritime cyber-attacks (Di Rollo,
2017), Therefore, developing cyber security policies and implementing multi-level
security strategies to address cyber threats and risk, along with prioritizing internal action
and increasing cybersecurity culture to promote security awareness and training of human
resources will be vital for a company’s safe operations.

Figure 1. Evolution of Cyber and Physical Threats. Source: Deloitte
The growth of digitalization and the connectedness produce pressure on the industry to be
more and more connected. Nonetheless, the absolute dependency of systems and
equipment regarding interconnectivity operations is creating more vulnerability and
representing an increase in opportunities for the cyber-criminal (NEP&I, 2017). A report
by Juniper research indicates that cybercrime will become a $2.1 trillion issue by 2019.
All the facets of the maritime industry will be impacted, including ocean container
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shipping, logistics, ports and related businesses, showing that in such a multifaceted
environment, there is a necessity for global action. For that reason this dissertation
examines the current cyber security situation in the maritime industry. It examines the
most significant cyber-attacks cases in the last seven years along with their consequences,
with the purpose of recommending that companies take into consideration the necessary
preventive actions required. Moreover, it reviews recent industry guidelines, and proposes
the creation of a cyber-security training and awareness program, with the objective of
reducing the consequences of future cyber-attacks.
1.2 Aim
The aim of this research is to compile all information available from open sources related
to cyber-attack cases in the maritime industry. This information is used to produce a
timetable of past cases along with a critical evaluation and analysis of the systems
involved, means of entry and consequences of each case, with the aim of increasing
awareness and carrying out risk analysis. A theoretical and literature review demonstrates
the exposure, vulnerabilities and possible consequences in terms of safety, environmental
and economic risk to the maritime sector. Furthermore, the current framework of
cybersecurity measures introduced in the maritime industry is discussed. Finally, expert
opinion is used to discuss and conclude, highlighting the importance of the cyber-attack
issue affecting the maritime industry.
1.3 Objectives
1.3.1

Create a list of recent cyber-attacks cases with detailed information,
through a collection of reports, mainly from maritime electronic journals,
magazines and articles, showing the specific areas affected and the
consequences of the cyber-attacks, to demonstrate the importance of the
cyber-security measures to the maritime industry.
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1.3.2

Collate data from questionnaires sent to flag administrations and ship
owners, to carry out a critical analysis of the current action taken against
cyber-attacks, making evident the relevance of the cyber-security system
in the maritime industry and the need for new regulations and effective
implementation regarding cyber security policy.

1.4 Scope of study and structure
The maritime transportation industry is a sector that, in terms of network and connectivity,
has long-range but, at the same time, many stakeholders are involved in the development
of the different processes. Therefore, the scope of this study is specifically limited to
shipping companies, port, maritime administration and ship systems (see figure 2), with
a classification of intentional direct and non-intentional direct, as a means of hazards for
the shipping systems in terms of cyber security.

Ships

Ports

Shipping
Companies

Maritime
Administrations

Figure 2. Scope of Study. Source: Author
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The analysis of cyber-attacks in the last seven years will make available a general
overview of the real situation of cybersecurity issues, and the current guidance and
shipping industry practice will provide sustenance for possible recommendations that
need to be taken into consideration to address this risk.
The structure of this dissertation includes six chapters:
Chapter I provides the introduction with background information, aim, objective,
dissertation structure and scope of the study, as well as the various relevant definitions.
Chapter II establishes a theoretical and literature review, which focuses on historical
background, exposure, vulnerability of technology systems supporting the maritime
industry and possible consequences of cyber-attacks in terms of safety, environment and
economy.
Chapter III demonstrates the investigation development, including the research
methodology, risk analysis, research questionnaire and hypothesis used in this research.
Chapter IV presents an assessment of the present cybersecurity measures using data from
past cybersecurity attacks and a risk analysis.
Chapter V reveals the cybersecurity mitigation practices through a summary of different
guidelines provided by the IMO and the maritime industry; it also presents a risk
mitigation analysis, evaluation of the actions and preventive measures taken by Flag
Administration and shipping companies, while carrying out a comparison of the data
collected from the questionnaire. Finally, it discusses the barriers to cyber security
implementation, which include cost, company policy, training, control and monitoring,
and enforcement by flag, coastal and port states.
Chapter VI summarizes the findings, and presents the conclusions, limitations and
recommendations obtained via this research.
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1.5 Definitions

Considering the complexity and different approaches in the terminology used to discuss
cyber security issues, a rigid framework of analysis is needed. Below, a list of the essential
terms and words used in the current research effort is provided. However, a more detailed
list of terms and definitions is attached in the annexes section.
I.

Cyber incident: is an occurrence, which actually or potentially results in adverse
consequences to an onboard system, network and computer or the information that
they process, store or transmit, and which may require a response action to mitigate
the consequences (BIMCO, 2016).

II.

Cyberattacks: Any type of offensive manoeuver that targets IT and OT systems,
computer networks, and/or personal computer devices attempting to compromise,
destroy or access company and ship systems and data (BIMCO, 2016).

III.

Cybersecurity: The activity or process, ability or capability, or state whereby
information and communications systems and the information contained therein are
protected from and/or defended against damage, unauthorized use or modification, or
exploitation. (ABS, 2016).

IV.

Hazard: Source, situation or act with a potential for harm, in terms of injury or ill
health, damage to property, damage to workplace environment or a combination of
these (ABS, 2016).

V.

Malware: is a generic term for a variety of malicious software which can infect
computer systems and impact on their performance (BIMCO, 2016).

VI.

Risk: According to Oxford dictionaries risk is defined as a situation involving
exposure to danger, with the possibility that something unpleasant or unwelcome will
happen (Oxforddictionaries, 2018).
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VII.

Virus: is a hidden, self-replicating section of computer software that maliciously
infects and manipulates the operation of a computer program or system (BIMCO,
2016).

VIII.

Vulnerability: A weakness of an asset, or group of assets, that can be exploited by one
or more threats (IET, 2016).

IX.

Information technology: Information Technology (IT) is a business sector that deals
with computing, including hardware, software, telecommunications and generally
anything involved in the transmittal of information or the systems that facilitate
communication (Techopedia, 2018).

X.

Operational technology: includes devices, sensors, software and associated
networking that monitor and control onboard systems (BIMCO, 2016).
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II.

ANALYSIS OF CYBER SECURITY THREATS.

2.1 Historical Background
Throughout history, the seas and the oceans have been associated with danger and
insecurity, as a consequence of geopolitical dispute and piracy attacks. For that reason,
issues of maritime security have become a concern among the stakeholders involved in
the maritime sector. The International Maritime Organization agenda has reflected these
concerns in recent years with certain regulatory initiatives. Over time, the panorama has
been modified, but the threat remains; a “new generation” of criminal has exchanged
weapons for computers, making cyber-attack the new security threat worldwide.
The complexity of the systems and the stakeholders involved in the maritime operation
necessitate that every company consider the threats from different perspectives, according
to the service provided and the vulnerabilities of the system. Nevertheless, the threats
presented in the maritime industry can be classified into two main elements: the
intentional direct threats and the un-intentional direct threats (see figure 3).
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Figure 3. Classification of Threats. Source: Author
The intentional direct can be attributed to:


Hacktivism or activist group: These groups are formed by ideologically motivated
individuals, for which the main action is an online protest with the aim of accessing
the system, and stealing sensitive information and data to use for a malicious
purpose (IET, 2016).



Espionage industrial competitor: They are organized to perform acts of espionage
with the main objective of obtaining access to confidential information, destroying
data and stealing intellectual property in order to use them for competitive
advantage or to disrupt business operations (IET, 2016).



Government-driven or state sponsored: There is a recognition in the maritime
industry that many countries are involved in cyber-attacks (see chapter 4). Their
purpose is to obtain access to state secrets, highly sensitive information,
commercial information and valuable documents, to be used with the intention of
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directly affecting another state or institution of high importance to a nation, and
with this act create national destabilization or chaos, or gain an economic
advantage or information control (IET, 2016).


Terrorism: Terrorist groups can use electronic and computerized media as a new
modus operandi to carry out their terrorist acts against other groups, nations, and
companies, gaining access and interrupting the operating system, for ideological,
religious or political interests or purposes (IET, 2016).



Criminals: Individuals or criminal organizations use cyber-attacks against
interconnected systems and networks, with the intention to carry out criminal
activities, mainly focused on fraudulent operations, extortions or theft of
intellectual property. It is also recognized that these criminals, when they obtain
access to the different systems, can control operating systems to facilitate the
trafficking of drugs, arms and contraband money to obtain economic benefits or
to sell valuable information to another (IET, 2016).

Un-intentional direct are related to:


Internal threat or Nature: These can be employee or service provider mistakes.
Internal employees can compromise the maritime industry systems by way of
negligence, carelessness, ignorance or just human error, by accidentally opening
malicious emails, using infected removable media, or accessing false websites and
social media. These unintentional acts expose sensitive systems or data to threats,
putting the security of companies at different levels of risk depending on the access
they have to systems (IET, 2016). It is recognized that this this type of threat
represents a lack of training and awareness of the employees and poses the
maximum risk for companies. Additionally, “by nature” can be described as an
error in a system, software or application stemming from bad installation or
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manufacture, which does not provide the security measures necessary to keep the
system safe. (NEP&I, 2016).
Table 1 demonstrates a number of the most significant threats identified within the
maritime industry and classified as Intentional Direct and Un-intentional Direct with their
objective, motivation and target. Each threat presented in this table represents a high risk
for the industry in different aspects. Some are more directly focused on personal economic
benefit; others are more related to competition and business interests. A few of them are
connected to ideological content, and ending with human error, as key factor which is
attributed to many maritime accident.
The examples of threats presented in Table 1 demonstrate that actors involved in cyberattacks incidents have well identified their targets in the shipping industry, and that the
technological advances create more opportunities for criminal organizations or individuals
to successfully perform cyberattacks.
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Table 1 Classification of Cyber Threats in Shipping

Source: Author
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2.2 Exposure
The exposure that characterizes the computerized system and its interconnectivity opens
up the door to smart attackers to perform their criminal acts, considering that the business
in the maritime sector has a very high profile with notable revenue. Unfortunately, the
consequence can be devastating (Marsh & McLennan, 2014). The most important security
goal of the Internet of Things is to ensure that security mechanisms used in the system can
properly ensure security of the data and system, using the three components of the CIA
triad (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) (see figure 4). Confidentiality of the data
represents the use of sensitive and confidential information by authorized personnel only,
and provides the security mechanisms to maintain the privacy of the data and system. The
Integrity mentioned in the CIA triad refers to the protection of valuable information and
data from external and internal actors during daily system use. Moreover, Availability
permits immediate access of authorized personnel to information and data for normal
operation or in dangerous situations, providing independence for the company in terms of
using their resources. Nevertheless, a break on one of these elements can result in serious
damage to the company security system, affecting the company operations and exposing
the systems involved (Farroq, Wasseem, Khairi & Mazhar, 2015).

Figure 4. CIA Triad. Source: Modified from Inmarsat.
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2.2.1 Companies
The exchange of information and data across many stakeholders involved in shipping
companies operations draws the attention of cybercriminals to performed attacks,
inasmuch as each system has different cybersecurity measures. Many systems are
involved in the process of handling valuable information, data and code. Bank
transferences and money movements are incentives for criminals. The most common
method is the use of ransomware, where the attacker encrypts the system (computer or
database), and requests the victim to pay a ransom to get the data back. This is very
comparable to piracy attacks where the criminal physically hijacks the vessel, crew and
cargo until someone pays a ransom, which in the history of Piracy attacks, has been a
successful business modus operandi. It is evident that the exposure in shipping companies
is reflected directly in the system, database and, operational and internal procedures,
which represent a valuable asset for the companies.

2.2.2 Ports
For the port operation, the main component is cargo handling; the includes the tracking,
transporting and inspecting system of the cargo until it is received by the retails, the unloading and loading system, which manipulated the cargo, and the crane operation for
distribution and movement of cargo. All of these modern systems and equipment now use
technology and network connections to carry out daily operations, making the exposure
of the port evident (DiRenzo, 2015). For example, the system used for movement of cargo
can be used for drug smuggling, weapon trafficking and other criminal acts. The control
of the cargo operation gives the criminal the facility to move cargo without authorization.
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2.2.3 Administrations
The data handled by the Maritime Administration contains a large amount of detailed
information, valuable to various maritime stakeholders. The system used by the maritime
administration can be exposed to cyber espionage by other states, whose aim is to obtain
access to sensitive data that can be used for their own purposes. Furthermore, ransom that
can be obtained is another motivation for these criminals. However, the maritime
administration also presents internal exposure with its large number of the employees,
who have access to critical systems and are interconnected with the network, increasing
exposure for the administration and the risk of being cyber attacked.

2.2.4

Ships

Exposure on modern ships has increased tremendously in recent years because of their
dependency on sophisticated electronic means like AIS (Automatic Identification
System), ECDIS (Electronic Chart Display and Information system), GPS (Global
Positioning System), VDR (Voyage Data Recorder), Radar/ARPA (Radio Direction and
Ranging)(Automatic Radar Plotting Aid), GMDSS (Global Maritime Distress and Safety
System), and other advanced system used and connected for the crew to vessel network
system ( see figure 5). All of these result in significant danger to the safety of the vessel’s
operation, which due to its interconnectivity and recurrent use, is open to cyber-attacks
(DiRenzo, 2015).
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Figure 5. Electronic System and Equipment onboard Vessels. Source: HudsonAnalytix.
Inc
AIS, since 2002, has been mandatory for all passenger and sea-going vessels with 300
gross tonnage or more. It is a tool for vessel safety, collision avoidance and ship's
monitoring, providing vessel information and status. Course, speed, and position are some
of the information displayed in the AIS for the safety and security of vessel operation.
However, the exposure of the AIS, concerning connectivity and information provider,
represents a high risk for vessel operation. If the AIS it is cyber attacked, the consequences
in terms of communication interconnectivity with ship-to-ship, ship-to-shore and shoreto-ship, can be significant (Tetreault, B. J, 2005). Furthermore, it has been proved that the
AIS does not have the necessary security measure integrated, exposing it to cyber-attacks.
The next chapter will present a cyber-attack case that demonstrates that it is possible to
deactivate and manipulate the AIS information to create a false collision or SAR alert
(Pajunen, 2017).
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Another electronic means exposed to cyber-attack is the Electronic Chart Display and
Information System, which in June of this year became mandatory for existing vessels as
an essential aid for navigation (see figure 6). The ECDIS runs in a basic computer without
an internet connection, which means that it cannot be remotely infected. However, the
high risk of exposure involves the system updates process by the bridge team because the
ECDIS does not have antivirus installed. This happens due to insufficient computing
power, and because the antivirus does not support the operating system used, which makes
the computer completely unprotected (Pajunen, N, 2017).

Figure 6. ECDIS & ARPA / RADAR. Source: Electro Technical Office
One of the main issues is that the bridge navigation equipment is more integrated. Some
manufacturers are the providers of many items of equipment, and they make it compatible.
As a consequence, the ship-owners find a practical way to buy equipment from only one
manufacturer to ensure compatibility. Additionally, interconnection with the engine,
remote accessibility, and poor design of software and hardware are critical factors in
exposure of the vessel and satellite communication.
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2.3 Vulnerability of Technological Systems

In the maritime environment, the equipment, systems and devices are rapidly increasing
the connectivity to the network, which facilitates accessibility and functionality and
provides more efficient operations. The connected devices include the navigational
system, communication system, cargo management system, engine system, dynamic
system, terminal management system, tracking system, logistic system and many more.
However, the growth of the connected devices results in high risk for the maritime
industry, increasing the vulnerability of all the integrated bridge, engine, cargo,
communication and land systems mentioned. For that reason, it is necessary that the
maritime sector evaluates the vulnerabilities in the sophisticated and interconnected
systems, which are incorporated in daily operations, and understand the complexity of
maritime system vulnerabilities. (Clark, 2017).

2.3.1 Companies
Shipping companies, due to the nature of the services they provide, the number of financial
transactions they conduct, and the sensitivity of the information and data they handle, have
become a very important sector to discuss in this research. Some the vulnerabilities that
are present in these companies are the IT systems at the operational and management
levels. These are involved in all the delicate company operations involving cargo
movement, authorizations, inspections, records, financial transactions, security access,
and human resources. Also vulnerable are the communication networks that help maintain
a continuous flow in terms of sending and receiving information and data between
stakeholders, including Wi-Fi, phone systems, and satellite communications (Reiskind,
2018). The lack of cyber security knowledge and awareness, the poor implementation of
policies and procedures related to cyber security, and undeveloped cyber risk management
are other common vulnerabilities of shipping companies (Allianz, 2016).
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The list of shipping company needs to be addressed individually because each company
has a different type of vulnerability depending on its services and its interconnection with
others.
2.3.2 Ports
The port operation is very complex because of the nature of the services provided, the
number of processes taking place in this infrastructure and the large number of workers
involved in the operation, which includes land, sea and economic activities. To ensure the
smooth flow of the operation, it is necessary to enhance physical and cyber security
measures. The International Ship Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) presents a clear
legislation on implementation and maintenance of port security measures. It includes
specific procedures and designates tasks and responsibilities, such Port Security Plan, Port
Security Officer and Port Facility Security Officer, covering ship and port facility
operations (Chiappetta, 2017). However, contemporary worldwide port operations are
profoundly connected with network management and logistics systems, including
tracking, loading, unloading and transportation of cargo. This dependency and reliance on
complex networked systems and interconnectivity create a significant vulnerability in the
system associates in port and cargo operation, which can become a subject of cyberattacks. (DiRenzo, 2015).
Vulnerabilities faced by ports are related to the interconnected operation of port
authorities, maritime companies, customs, ministries, financial institutions, vessels,
crews, cargoes, IT providers, infrastructures, and data flow that are vital for maritime trade
and the world economy.
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2.3.3 Administrations

A Maritime Administration has under its umbrella many areas of interest, such as vessel
and seafarer certification, vessel registers, port authorities, inspections, applications,
enforcement, business transactions, money transfers, national and international
communication, databases, international offices, integrated systems,

and network

systems. All these operating systems are connected to electronic means and interconnected
with each other and with the different partners and customers, which can be potentially
vulnerable to cyber-attacks. For that reason, the maritime administration in addition to
regulating the stakeholders involved in the services it provides, must take the appropriate
measures to safeguard its own system, data and information.

In addition, each

administration should carry out an internal risk analysis to determine the possible
vulnerability of its system to cyber-attacks and implement internal cyber security
measures in terms of identifying, protecting, detecting, responding, recovering and
creating a cyber-security culture (Kneeland, 2014).

2.3.4 Ships
One of the most essential systems used for the safety of navigation and operation of the
ship are GPS, ECDIS and AIS. GPS, which provides vessel positioning, is indispensable
to the vessel’s navigation. Jamming of the GPS can represent a substantial challenge for
the safety of vessel navigation. Another important system is the Automatic Identification
System, which, as a result of the cyber-attacks, can create a ghost ship that can be detected
by other vessels and ports. A cyber-attack could also modify ship information details, such
as course, name, cargo, position, and speed, or send false warnings, alarms and distress
signals. One more system used for vessel navigation is the Electronic Chart Display and
Information System, used to supplement the old-style navigation charts. It is
interconnected with other vessel systems and sensors, such as Navigational Telex
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(Navtex), AIS, echo-sounder, radar, and anemometer (Clark, 2017). The exclusive
reliance on electronic systems, which can be cyber-attacked, can result in danger for
maritime operations, as presented in section 4.1: Different cybersecurity attack cases and
their consequences.
According to cyber keel report, a satellite communication study was carried out by
IOActive Security Company in 2013, using Inmarsat and Iridium Sat-Com terminals. The
result of this study indicates that certain systems have severe security issues. All the
devices included in the scope of the analysis could be abused and easily compromised,
just as a sending a message from one vessel to another; compromising satellite
communication system, gives to the attackers' control of the information that passes
through the satellite link. However, another vulnerability faced in terms of vessels and
sat-com is the fact that crew, passengers and external persons have access to the ship, and
sometimes to the equipment and systems. This situation highlights the lack of control of
the IT system and the over reliability on the ship-owner’s side (Cyberkeel, 2014).
To address these vulnerabilities, it is recommended that ship owners implement the cyber
guidance provided by the sector and carry out the necessary risk assessments.
Additionally, they should train the crew and personnel involved in ship operations.
Moreover, ships need to be build according to the International Association of
Classification Societies (IACS) standards and recommendations (see figure 7), and
systems and equipment should have contemporary software (Sørensen, 2018).
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Figure 7. IACS Recommendations. Source: BIMCO

The examples mentioned demonstrate how fragile the interconnectivity in the maritime
industry has become, showing that disruption and failure in the critical systems and
equipment have caused severe impacts on maritime transportation, worldwide trade and
international economies.

2.4 Possible Consequences of Cyber Attacks

The magnitude of the consequences of cyber-attacks depends on the nature of the cyberattacks themselves, the complexity of the scenarios and the procedures already established
by the industry. Following is possible descript consequences of the cyber-attacks in term
of safety, environment and economic impact.
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2.4.1 Safety
There are many systems, types of equipment and various technologies in the maritime
industry and onboard vessels, including bridge, cargo handling, ship control access,
propulsion, machinery, communication, and administrative which depend on the
electronic systems (Belmont, 2016). The International Maritime Organization through
The International Convention for the Safety of Life At Sea (SOLAS), Regulation V/19,
20 and 27 requires carrying onboard an AIS and ECDIS and requires having a receiver for
a global navigation satellite system (GPS). However, some of the safety risks that have
been reported are in navigation equipment system, such as the AIS, ECDIS, and GPS,
which are essential for navigation, and vessel positioning. For that reason, jamming or
disruption on any of these essential navigation systems becomes a severe problem that can
affect the maritime industry (Caldwell, 2010).

2.4.2 Environment
Environmental pollution is another potential risk related to cyber-security. Every year,
diesel, oil, petrol and other toxic chemicals are spilt into the sea. The majority of the
accidents involve tanker vessels, barges, platforms and petroleum shore stations. The
reasons for oil spills occurring include vessel collisions, groundings, oil cargo transfers,
fuel tank overflows or oily water pumped from the bilge. Oil spills on the sea can have
severe impacts, including damage to wildlife, habitats, and ecosystems. One case of severe
environmental damage inflicted by an oil spilled is the case of M/T Exxon Valdez, in
which the vessel ran aground in Prince William Sound in 1989, spilling 10.8 millions of
US gallons of crude oil in Alaskan waters. It is considered one of the most dramatic and
devastating accidents related to oil spills, destroying and killing thousands of mammals,
fish, whales, and birds. Today evidence of persistent pollution still exists in Prince
William Sound, representing significant damage to the ecosystem of the area and the
residents’ health (Belmont, 2016).
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There are many environmental risks in the maritime industry, such as ballast water
discharge, sewage, and emission of gasses. All the equipment or apparatuses on board the
vessels that regulate loading, discharge, and emissions, are controlled by electronic
systems if the vessel is cyber attacked, all this equipment is vulnerable and can be used to
carry out criminal acts or specific damage, signifying a potential risk to the environment
and human health. Additionally, malware infections have occurred on several offshore
rigs and platforms in recent years. According to the Houston Chronicle, cyber-attackers
such as criminals or terrorists with knowledge of oil platforms, refineries, pipelines and
technology systems can distribute malware in these structures, representing a catastrophic
scenario and high level of risk to people and to the environment (Shauk, 2013).
The maritime industry must be cognizant of the probable devastating effects that cyberattacks can have on shipping companies, vessels, ports and maritime administrations, with
catastrophic environmental impacts and consequences that can result in business
interruption, financial loss and reputational effects. To minimize the possible negative
outcomes in terms of environmental damage, it is essential to develop and implement
robust cybersecurity measures and actions (Ginter, 2010).
2.4.3 Economic
Information technology is one of the utmost important factors in modern business
operations, if the business information and systems are not secured appropriately, the
system, data and information are susceptible to cyber-attacks. As is mentioned above, the
maritime industry is not immune to cyber-attacks. The data and confidential information
that is handled by the maritime sector is very attractive to cyber attackers. Furthermore,
particular economic risks involve business interruption, information recovery, equipment
repair and system installation, which, as mentioned in this chapter, represent a great loss
for the companies. In addition, the necessary actions to avoid future cyber incidents denote
a considerable investment in cyber-security systems for the companies (Rose, 2017).
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Today almost all companies use networks, internet and interconnected systems as a
principal means for business; in fact, many companies do not even have physical offices.
Everything is done online. However, all these operations and activities can be monitored
and interfered with. In that event, protection from cyber-attacks is required to minimize
possible economic consequences that can directly or indirectly affect individuals,
organizations and society. According to Arthur J. Gallagher & Co, an insurance firm, the
transportation sector is ranked third in terms of cyber vulnerability. According to the
firm’s study, 2017 was a top year for cyber-attacks, with an average financial cost per
average medium sized company of around $3.79 million (Gallagher, 2018).
Another relevant economic consequence resulting from cyber-attacks is the loss of
intellectual property, which is one of the biggest threats to the business. Indeed, companies
have been investing in cyber-security systems to prevent the loss of intellectual property.
This means that many companies have suffered monetary costs investing in new systems
and technology. According to Business Matters (2016), the “United Kingdom government
report highlighted IP (Intellectual Properties) theft as the most damaging cyber-crime for
UK businesses, resulting in a loss of £9.2bn a year”.

2.5 Concluding Thoughts

In this chapter, the different threats, exposure, vulnerability and possible consequences
related to cyber security issues were discussed. It is important to understand how the
threats can affect the maritime industry, other sectors, society and economy. However,
depends on the service that each company provides. For that reason, it is necessary to
carry out a risk assessment to understand the threat and risk level, and the exposure and
vulnerability of each system and piece of equipment. Nevertheless, the commitment in
this respect needs to start at management and organizational level and then filter down to
the different organizational levels.
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Untrained or inadequate trained personnel represent a high-risk to each shipping
operation. As a consequence, the education and training of the personnel needs to be taken
into consideration as a key element of the safety and security of the shipping operation.
Another essential element is the use of the guidelines provided by the maritime sector.
This is in relation to shipping companies. However, as other stakeholders are involved.
Therefore, it is critical to keep in mind that the consequence of a cyber-attack, which can
result in catastrophic consequences in terms of safety and the environment, can also cause
serious commercial and economic loss. The important point here is that the industry is
working hard to regulate vessels but what will happen with ports, shipping companies,
maritime administrations, suppliers, venders and many other stakeholders involved in
vessel operations?.
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III.

RESEARCHING CYBERSECURITY EVENTS RELATED TO THE
MARITIME INDUSTRY

3.1 Methodology
The method used in this research is a combination of descriptive and analytical methods,
reviewing and comparing the actions implemented and preventive measures taken by
shipping companies and flag administrations against cyber-attacks. Additionally, different
cyber-attack cases and their consequences are discussed, making evident the impact of
cyber-attacks in the maritime industry in terms of safety, environmental and economic
risk.
The collection of data for this dissertation was carried out through a literature review
obtained mainly from various articles, electronic magazines, publications and books from
different maritime magazines, shipping companies, flag administration statements, and
classifications societies’ web sites. This collection of data as primary sources is collected
through an internet search and physical access.
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The literature selected for review was based on a survey of 53 people, which revealed that
the most well-known electronic maritime magazines are Fair Play, Digital Ship,
Tradewinds and Lloyd´s List, which it is presented in figure 8 respectively. All of these
journals are specialize directly in the shipping industry, with a long history and prestige
in the sector.

Figure 8. Electronic Magazine Survey Result. Source: Author
The literature review covers the last seven years of cybersecurity issues (2012-2018),
taking into consideration the most significant cases presented to the public in this period.
The total number of the papers reviewed for this research was 1,069, including:


Lloyd´s List 657



Fair Play 18



Digital ship 130



Others 144



Tradewinds 120

In which the keyword used are:


Cybersecurity



Security



Cyber-attacks



Attacks



Cyber

The results showed 181 papers associated with cyber security issues as an investigated
subject.
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Table 2 shows the most significant cyber-attack cases compiled during the collection of
data, pointing out the limitations associated with protected information, in that many
companies keep attacks secret as a protective measure. Nevertheless, Table 1 presents a
brief summary of the public cyberattack cases. Detailed information regarding these cases
is provided in the Chapter IV, 4.1 Past cyber-attack cases.
A small classification of fact is presented, where:
 One * mean low probability of being attacked
 Two ** mean medium probability of being attacked
 Three *** mean high probability of being attacked
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Table 2 Cyber Attacks Cases
Date

System

Mean of
Entry

Name or Place

IT system
hacked

The Islamic
Republic of Iran
Shipping Lines
(IRISL)

Consequence


2011

2012

2012

Shipping
Company
Operational
System

Shipping
Company
Operational
System

Cargo &
Tracking System

Possible
other state
involved

Phishing
mail
employee
sabotage
Possible
other state
involve

IT system
hacked

State Owner
Iran





Damage operational data &
Internal company
communication network
Movement of cargo without
company control resulting in
lost and incorrect delivery of
cargo
Financial loss
Files disappear
Disconnected Phone
Connection
Loss of network
communication
Disconnection of internal
network
35.000 computer shutdown
No money transference
enabled
Stop operations
Five month to restore system
Financial loss




Loss control of cargo systems
Drug smuggling transportation








Saudi Aramco
Company Oil &
Gas Operator
State Owner
Saudi Arabia

The Australian
Custom and Border
Protection
Australia
Government





Classification

***

***

Reference





Gliha, D. 2017
Hayes, 2016
Hutchins, 2015






Vella Heidi, 2016
Pagliery, 2015
Perlroth, 2012
Reuter, 2012



Meyer-Larsen Nils,
2017

*
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Date

System

Mean of
Entry

Name or Place

Virus
Infiltrated
by Pdf Doc

Danish Maritime
Authority

2012

Maritime
Administration
Systems

Consequence


Denmark

2013

Port Cargo &
Tracking System

Virus
Infiltrated





Port of Antwerp



Belgium




2013

2016

2017

Malicious
software
download
by USB
with piracy
virus

Oilrig & platform

280 Vessels
GPS System

Jammed by
hacker

Vessels on
South Korea

One container
Vessel

Navigation
system
hacked

Course of
Cyprus to Djibouti

Operational
System

Houston
United States of
America













Disclosure of sensitive
information
Propagation of the virus to
other governmental institutions
Shutdown network system
Control by criminal of the
security access
Control by criminal of cargo
operation
Drug smuggling and money
laundering for 2 years
Incapacitation of computers
and operating systems
Paralyzation of one oilrig
Loss of communication with
navigational system
Immobilization of thruster
Drifting
Problems with navigational
systems
GPS signal died
GPS signal false information
Vessels stop operation
Loss of control of the vessel
navigation for 10 hours
No maneuvers permitted
Invest of maritime security
program

Classification

Reference



Cyberkeel, 2014
The local, 2014

*







Clark Julian, 2017
Bateman, 2013
Bell, 2013
Europol, 2013
Digital Ship, 2014/17

**





Belmont, 2016
Hayes, 2016
Shauk, 2013

**




Graham, 2017
Saul, 2017

**




OSM, 2018
Tanya Blake, 2017

*
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Date

System

Mean of
Entry

Name or Place

2017

Port System

Not Petya
Virus

A.P. Moller-Mearsk

2017

Shipping
company
System

Hacked
computer
system

BW Group
Singapore

Consequence







Massive disruption of systems
Port operation suspended
Cargo operation suspended
IT system shutdown
Financial loss
Invest in new equipment and
software




Internet connection suspended
Company operation affected
(Ports and vessels operations,
oil and gas production)
Financial loss



2017

Shipping
company
System

Hacked by
virus

Clarkson Shipbroker





2018

Shipping
company
system

Ransomwa
re attack

Long Beach
Terminal Cosco
U.S.A.



Access to the company’s
computer system
Criminal access to data and
information system
Invest in security measure
Criminal obtain access to the
company’s computer system,
sensitive data and information
Shutdown network system

Classification

Reference

*








Novet, 2017
Jon, 2018
Digital Ship, 2017/18
Fairplay, 2018
Tradewinds, 2018
Lloyd´s list 2017/18

***





Platts, 2017
Mohindru, 2017
Tradewinds, 2017






Digital Ship, 2018
Nadkarmi Namrata,
2017
Clarkson PLC, 2017
Tradewinds, 2018



Tradewinds, 2018

***

***

Source: Author
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As a secondary source of information, stakeholders, such as ship owners and flag
administrations, were approached via interview, meeting, e-mail, and calls to collect
information regarding previous cyber-attack issues and the implementation of
preventive measures regarding cyber-security systems. Additionally, to findings were
compared with those obtained from the literature review. This analysis is carry out
through the answer received of the questioner send by the internet. The Table 3, shows
the number of questionnaires sent, number of responses received and the total number
classified in shipping companies and maritime administrations.
Table 3 Shipping Companies and Maritime Administration Questionnaire
Information
QUESTIONNAIRES

N° OF

N° OF ANSWERS

TO:

QUESTIONNAIRES

RECEIVED

SENT
SHIPPING

16

2

14

3

30

5

COMPANIES
MARITIME
ADMINISTRATIONS
TOTAL

3.2 Risk Analysis

Maritime accidents and incidents often occur in the shipping industry because it is a
global and brutally competitive environment, which can be characterized by high, fast
and expanding commercial pressure, remote owners, sub-standard ships, multinational
crew, accelerated technological changes and lack of compliance with mandatory
regulations. For that reason, when important decisions have to be made, it is necessary
to carry out a risk management analysis. One of the steps in the process is risk analysis,
wherein the collection, evaluation and study of previous cases play an important role.
Risk assessment has been used in different industries and systems. Depending on the
interpretation of the risk analysis, different measures and actions can be taken.
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In this paper, a risk analysis will be carried out in chapter IV as part of the methodology
used in this research. It will show the different hazards related to cybersecurity matters
and the fact that this hazard will lead directly to damage, injury and loss in terms of
safety, environmental and economic impacts.

3.3 Research Questions


What kind of security measures and procedures are set up for ship owners and flag
administrations against the digital reality of cyber-attacks?



Is the virtual world a handicap for shipowners and flag administrations against
cyber-attacks?



Are the guardians of the shipowners’ and flag administrations’ systems strong
enough to react when a cyber-attack is in progress and, thus, reduce the risks in
terms of safety, environment, and economy?

Based on the previous question, a questionnaire was summited to different shipping
companies and flag administrations with the following questions for the purpose of
gathering the necessary information to carry out a part of the analysis for this research.
Questionnaire for shipping companies:
I.

General:

1.

Do you consider that cyber-attacks are an important issue that needs to be
addressed by your company?

2.

How does your company classify cyber risks?

3.

Has your company been confronted with any kind of cyber-attacks in the
past? Please provide detail, if so.

4.

What were the main losses to your company, as a consequence of cyberattacks?

5.

Did your company face any safety consequences caused by cyber-attacks?
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6.

Did your company face any environmental consequences caused by cyberattacks?

7.

Did your company face any economic consequences caused by cyber-attacks?

II.

Legal: Law, Administrations, Ministry

8.

Do you consider that cyber-attacks issues (on vessels, shipping companies,
Administration, and in the general maritime industry) must be covered by
insurance?

9.

Does the insurance of your company cover cyber-attacks or technological
failures?

III.

Policy: Guidelines, Soft Law

10.

What kind of actions or preventive measures are established in your company
regarding cyber security?

11.

Is there any policy or procedure regarding cyber security established in your
company?

12.

What type of measures are established, related to the technological system by
your company in terms of recovery?

13.

When was the last time that your company carried out a cyber-security
assessment?

14.

Do you consider it necessary to establish new regulations to address cyber
security issues?

IV.

Implementation: Operational Level, DPA, Crew.

15.

In case of cyber-attacks, who is the person/department responsible for
handling these issues?

16.

Is there any response plan in place, established by your company, in case of
cyber-attacks?

17.

Does your company have available educational training regarding
cybersecurity and cyber best practices? Please provide details, if so.
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Questionnaire for Flag Administration
I.

General:

1.

Do you consider that cyber-attacks are an important issue that need to be
addressed by your Administration?

2.

How does your Administration classify cyber risks?

3.

Has your Administration confronted any kind of cyber-attacks in the past?
Please provide details, if so.

4.

What were the main losses to your Administration as a consequence of cyberattacks?

5.

Did your Administration face any safety consequences caused by cyberattacks?

6.

Did your Administration face any environmental consequences caused by
cyber-attacks?

7.

Did your Administration face any economic consequences caused by cyberattacks?

II.

Legal:

8.

Do you consider that cyber-attacks issues on (vessels, shipping companies,
Administration, and in the general maritime industry) must be covered by
insurance?

9.

Does the insurance of your administration cover cyber-attacks or
technological failures?

III.

Policy:

10.

What kind of actions or preventive measures are established in your
Administration regarding cyber security?

11.

Is there any policy or procedure regarding cyber security established in your
Administration?

12.

What type of measures have been established related to the technological
system by your Administration in terms of recovery?
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13.

When was the last time that your Administration carried out a cyber-security
assessment?

14.

Do you consider that it is necessary to establish new regulation to address
cyber security issues?

IV.

Implementation:

15.

In case of cyber-attacks, who is the person/department responsible for
handling these issues?

16.

Is there any response plan in place, established by your Administration, in
case of cyber-attacks?

17.

Does your Administration have available educational training regarding
cybersecurity and cyber best practices? Please provide details, if so.

3.4 Hypothesis

The risks of cyber-attacks have made cyber-security a major concern due to the
sophisticated technologies used today. Exposure and vulnerability of the different
systems and the possible consequences that can affect the maritime sector are making
clear the importance of addressing these issues.
Stakeholders in the maritime industry have, in recent years, developed some cyber
security mitigation guidance. However, the maritime industry will need to continue
working hard against cyber-attacks, pushing itself to take into consideration the
guidelines provided. Nevertheless, there is a barrier in terms of making cyber-attacks
public. It will be necessary that the sector consider making any internal incident of
cyber-attack public since this information can serve as an example to other
stakeholders, and could significantly reduce the risk and probability of cyber-attacks.
Are the shipping companies and flag administration systems strong enough to have
control of their data and operations? Due to the sensitive nature of this subject matter,
some difficulties have been presented in terms of the collection of data. For that reason,
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a comparative analysis could not be carried out. However, as general advice for the
maritime industry, it will be necessary to take into consideration the guidance
mentioned above and continue to invest in actions and preventive measures to reduce
the risk of cyber-attacks.
3.5

Concluding Thoughts

This chapter presents the methodology used for the research effort, which clearly
shows the resources and parameter used to carry out this dissertation, with an
explanation of the selected sources of collection of data and literature review. A table
presents the most significate cyber-attacks cases, categorized by date, system, mean of
entry, name and place of the companies involved, consequences of the attacks and
small classification of the cases, with their appropriate reference. Additionally, a
questioner data from a survey, which was carried out within shipping companies and
maritime administration, it is presented and finalizing with a hypothesis section to
conclude this chapter.
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IV.

ASSESSMENT OF SELECTED CYBERSECURITY CASES FROM THE
LITERATURE REVIEW IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN CONSEQUENCES

4.1 Past Cyber Attack Cases

In 2015, the transportation industry was ranked in the top five industries experiencing
cyber-attacks. Furthermore, a Danish shipping survey, in 2017, showed that 69 percent
of shipping companies had been subjected to cyber-attacks (Figueroa, 2018). Systems
used by ships, shipping companies, ports and flag states handles a significant amount
of confidential and monetary information that catches the attention and interest of
criminals, making these systems a target for attacks. Additionally, lack of training and
human error represents a high risk for the safety of a company’s operations.
Certain cyber-attack cases in the maritime industry have been exposed to the public,
including their consequences and their breakpoint related to the CIA model. The CIA
model is a triad of information security used for evaluation and analysis, where C =
confidentiality, the ability to ensure that data and information systems are hidden from
unauthorized persons, I =integrity, the ability to assure that the data and information
system are trusted, and A = availability to ensure that the data and information system
are accessible and available to authorized personnel when required.


2011, The Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL).

The Iranian state-owned IRISL, in August 2011, suffered significant damage to all its
shipping operations data, which included loading, cargo, rate, date, place and internal
company communication networks, because of cyberattacks. At the time of the attack,
the shipping line was the largest in the Middle East, with a fleet of 170 vessels. The
attack was concentrated in the system of IRISL. One of the consequences faced was
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the data of tracking its carrier was lost, which resulted in the container movement being
carried out without any company control. Some of the cargo disappeared during this
period disappeared (Hutchins, 2015). The breakpoint related to the CIA model shows
that, in this case, availability was disrupted. However, in due course, the data was
restored and the system recovered. Nevertheless, the disruption of company operations
led to cargo loss and other cargo was delivered to incorrect endpoints, resulting in a
notable financial loss (Gliha, 2017). The Managing Director of IRISL, Mr.
Mohammad Hussein, stated that, in relation to the considerable damage suffered due
to the attack, he believes that an outside government was involved in the case (Hayes,
2016).


2012, Saudi Aramco, oil and gas operator.

In 2012, the major Saudi Arabian state owned oil and gas company, Saudi Aramco,
which provides 10 % of the global oil suffered a cyber-attack during Ramadan month.
An employee of the company opened a phishing mail with an infected link. According
to Abdullah al-Saadan, vice president for corporate planning of Aramco, the primary
intention behind this attack was to stop the flow of oil and gas to the international and
national market (Reuter, 2012). The US investigation highlighted that the employee’s
action was for sabotage purposes sponsored by another state for political motives, but
no supporting evidence of this claim was presented (Perlroth, 2012). However, some
files disappeared, the phone connection died, 35.000 computers shut down and threequarters of the Aramco PC data was erased, showing that the element from the CIA
model affected was availability. Nonetheless, the company, because of this attack, was
unable to send or receive money transfers or contracts, nor process payments, forcing
the company to stop operations and shut down its internal corporate network (Pagliery,
2015). Seventeen days after the attack, the company started to provide free oil to keep
the flow of the operation with Saudi Arabia. However, it took around five months for
the company, after a new security computer system was installed, to run again in
normal conditions (Vella, 2016).
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2012, Australia Custom and Border Protection.

Another cyber-attack in which the integrity factor of the CIA model was disrupted was
the case against the Australian Custom and Border Protection cargo system in 2012.
The criminal with access to the cargo system was able to use the shipper’s transport to
smuggle drugs. With the ability to track cargo movements, the attacker was able to
determine when the container was classified as suspicious or malicious by the police,
and abandon their operation (Meyer-Larsen Nils, 2017). According to Michael
Cardony, Custom and Border Protection chief, investment in an intelligent and security
integrated cargo system was carried out.


2012, Danish Maritime Authority.

In April 2012, the Danish Maritime Authority was subjected to a cyber-attack.
However, it was not until 2014 that the Administration discovered the attack. The
attack was simply introduced by a Pdf document infected with a virus, and the virus
was propagated from the Danish Maritime Authority to other government institutions
before it was discovered in 2014 (Linton, 2016). Sensitive information from Danish
shipping companies and merchant navy fell into the hands of hackers. In this case, the
three components of the CIA model were influenced. However, according to the
Danish Defense Intelligent Service report, the attack was sponsored by another state
(Cyberkeel, 2014). It was difficult to assign blame without the necessary evidence, but
the Danish administration had its own clues related to which state was involved in the
incident. As a result of the episode, The Danish Maritime Authority shut down its
whole network system for several days, and installed a new anti-virus program as a
preventive measure. After the attack, an increase in security measures and the
interdependency of the system was put in place (The local, 2014). This case shows that
the maritime administrations are also vulnerable to cyber-attacks, highlighting that the
damage they can suffer in their operational systems can directly affect important daily
operations, international and national transactions and customer services as an
example.
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2013, Computerized cargo tracking and release system on Port of
Antwerp.

One very interesting incident involved the Port of Antwerp in Belgium, one of the
biggest ports in Europe and in the world, which was used for drug smuggling in late
2013. The operation had been ongoing since 2011 and was discovered because a
container disappeared from the port. The hacker, via a virus, infiltrated the
computerised cargo tracking and release system of at least two operating companies in
the port, gaining full remote control and access to the terminal system (Bell, 2013).
The hacker was able to identify shipping containers where drugs had been hidden and
release them to a trucker without the authorization or knowledge of the port or the
shipping lines (Clark, 2017). The perpetrator then deleted information and the
existence of the container from the port system. When the authorities uncovered the
attack, they found 1044 kilos of cocaine, 1099 kilos of heroin, guns and more than 1.3
million Euro in a suitcase (Europol, 2013), representing only a small portion of the
amount that criminals had been able to transport for two years (Bateman, 2013). In this
specific case, two components, confidentiality and integrity, of the CIA model were
affected. Using containers for trafficking is not new, but the fact is that criminals now
have a new method for performing the acts, using technology and vulnerable systems
to be more successful in their crimes.


2013, Oil rig Platform in USA.

A significant incident involved an oilrig and platform in the United States of America,
specifically Houston, in 2013. The incident involved malicious software downloaded
unintentionally by offshore oil workers. The malware was downloaded aboard by
laptops, USB drives or directly from online sources through satellites (Shauk, 2013).
The files, which were infected with malware from land with pornography and music,
incapacitated computers and operating systems on some rigs and platforms (Hayes,
2016). One direct effect was that one rig was paralyzed and unable to communicate
with the navigation rig system, resulting in immobilization of thrusters and the
navigational system. As a consequence, the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU)
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drifted from the drilling site. This incident clearly shows that the availability element
of the CIA model was compromised, creating a high risk for the environment and delay
in operations (Belmont, 2016).


2016, Vessels GPS in Korea

In April 2016, South Korea reported that 280 vessels suffered problems with their
navigational systems. The GPS signal was jammed by hackers; consequently, some of
the GPS signals died and others received false information. In some cases, the GPS
showed the position of vessels that were sailing on the sea as apparently being on land
(Saul, 2017). When the GPS did not provide accurate information, the vessel had to
return to port. The availability related to navigation equipment in respect to the CIA
model was interrupted. South Korea claimed that North Korea was involved in the
incidents (Graham, 2017). Nevertheless, losing a GPS signal represents a severe
navigation problem, mainly if it occurs in bad weather conditions, inadequate visibility
or vessel traffic areas. In these circumstances, if the GPS does not work correctly, the
potential risk for a disaster with catastrophic consequences at sea is very high.


2017, Navigation system in a Container vessel

The IT system of a container ship of 8,250 Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit (TEU) in the
course of Cyprus to Djibouti was completely hacked in February 2017. The attack took
control of the navigation system of the vessel for a period of around ten hours, making
it impossible for the captain to perform navigation maneuvers (OSM, 2018). The
intention of the cyber pirates, firstly, was to gain full control over the vessel navigation
systems and then direct the ship to an area where they could take complete control
over the ship. The availability of the CIA model was compromised and, possibly the
integrity was affected as well if the vessel was completed controlled by cyber pirates.
After the company provided an IT expert onboard the vessel, the crew regained control
of the navigation system of the vessel. The company installed a maritime industry
program to block attacks from outside that could influence the IT system. (Blake,
2017)
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2017, Port Operations of A.P. Moller-Maersk.

One clear case that shows how cyber-attacks can have a severe impact is the case of
A.P. Moller-Maersk. The attack by a Not Petya Virus was directed at the port system.
In this case, after massive disruptions, port operations were suspended in several port
terminals controlled by Maersk division, in the United States, India, Spain, the
Netherlands and other countries. No containers were received or delivered in 76
Maersk Ports, and the IT system was shut down, resulting in significant business
interruption during the shutdown period. Maersk operations represent 15 per cent of
all container trade worldwide (Novet, 2017).
The impact of the cyber-attack was around USD 300-400 million in lost revenue,
45.000 computers affected, and the paralysis of cargo transport through the company’s
ships and ports, manifesting a significant influence on the availability component of
the CIA model. This case is one of the most exciting cases presented because the attack
affected ships, ports and company operations at the same time, reflecting that a
compromise in one system that is interconnected represents a considerable risk for
shipping operations. Additionally, the company invested in 4.000 new servers, 45.000
new PCs and 2.500 applications, all in a period of ten days (Digital Ship, 2018).
However, this attack had a direct impact not only on AP Moller Maersk’s operations,
but also on worldwide trade and the maritime industry in a commercial sense, giving
many lessons for the industry in terms of cyber security (Guy Jon, 2018).


2017, Computer system in BW Group Singapore.

A further case involved BW Group Singapore, one of the world largest shipping
companies, with a fleet that includes tankers, bulk carriers, gas carriers and offshore
floating unit. The attack was severe (Mohindru, 2017). The company´s computer
system was hacked, which led to its Internet and Intranet systems being temporarily
suspended. During the attack, the company system was inaccessible from outside,
affecting the company operations, including ports, containers, oil tanker vessels,
tugboats, drilling operations, and oil and gas production, representing millions of
dollars in financial loss for the company. The integrity and availability components of
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the CIA model were influenced by the attacks. Although the company claimed that
the attack was not related to a ransomware attempt, it shows that in the multi-billiondollar shipping industry, cyber-security is crucial to the usual way of operation (Platts,
2017).


2017, Computer system of Clarkson.

In November of 2017, one of the most famous shipbrokers, service providers and
analyzers of the merchant shipping and the offshore market, Clarkson, was the victim
of a cyber-incident. Clarkson’s main office claimed that the incident involved
unauthorized access to the company’s computer system, reflecting that the
confidentiality and integrity of the company with respect to the CIA model were
compromised in all the senses. However, it did not disrupt business (Nadkarmi
Namrata, 2017). The company provided an apology and tried to contact all possible
clients and individuals that might have been affected by this attack; the CEO of
Clarkson, Andi Case, also mentioned that “cybersecurity is at the forefront of many
business agendas” (Digital Ship, 2018). As an outcome of this incident, the company
immediately put in place additional security measures and took necessary actions to
prevent future similar incidents, protecting clients’ data (Clarkson PLC, 2017).


2018, Long Beach Terminal of Cosco.

Cosco Long Beach Terminal affiliated with Cosco Shipping was subjected to a
ransomware attack in July 2018. The attack did not affect the company’s operations.
However, the company decided to shut down connections with other regions, for a
short period, including emails and networking phone, as a preventive measure.
However, in relation to measures taken by the company the availability aspect of the
CIA model was directly affected. Nevertheless, the company sent a letter to their
customers to clarify the incident and make a statement highlighting that the operating
system was stable after the attack and that they were working to recover from the
episode (Tradewinds, 2018).
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The afore-mentioned were just some cases of cyber-attacks in the shipping industry.
Nevertheless, many shipping and port companies are reluctant to report incidents for
fear of loss of reputation and insurance actions, emphasizing the possibility of opening
a Pandora’s Box for future attacks. However, such attacks pose a risk to the integrity
of vessels, ports, companies and administrations. Additionally, they represent notable
economic losses for the maritime industry and possibly catastrophic consequences for
human life and the environment. For that reason, jamming or disruption on any of the
essential systems used in the maritime sector becomes a severe problem that can
impact the maritime industry in general (Caldwell, 2010).

4.2 Risk Analysis

After the brief review of the cases presented in this chapter, the current section will
present, in detail, the most significant cases of cyber-attacks in the maritime industry,
with the aim of providing a real picture of the situations that are being presented by
shipping companies, ports, ships and administrations through cases exposed. However,
the cyber-attacks in the maritime sector are real and it is evident that the motivation of
intentional direct cyber-attackers is concentrated but not limited to financial rewards.
In addition, system infiltration, control and damage can be used to steal money straight
from maritime companies for the purpose of carrying out weapon contraband, drugs
smuggling, terrorist attacks or cyber espionage. Nevertheless, the non-intentional
direct parties, such as employees, workers or crew can represent a high risk for the
companies either by lack of knowledge, awareness or just pure curiosity.

In such

instances, the system can be affected from the inside of the company through infected
email and removable media (Gliha, D, 2017).
The only element that interferes with the continuity of advances in technological
systems is security and privacy. Fortunately, investment has been made in
infrastructure and cybersecurity to control and prevent related problems; however,
these achievements should continue and expand progressively through appropriate
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investigations and studies on privacy and security, with the objective of providing new
cybernetic solutions to the existing problems, instead of just focusing on new
technological and interrelated systems. This approach will provide a better
technological service to the maritime sector, significantly reducing the risk of cyber
incidents (Farroq, Wasseem, Khairi & Mazhar, 2015).

4.3 Concluding Thoughts

In this chapter it is discussed the selected past cyber-attacks cases, giving an overview
and detailed information, highlighting that more and more remote and interconnected
system is used for the shipping operations, remarking that without a proper
cybersecurity measure, the cyber-attacks can compromise the system and equipment
affecting the respective operation. One of the important points that can bring to the
table, it is the unpredictable case of Maersk, in the fact that, the attack has been
performed to systems that have been used for many years in the maritime industry,
demonstrating that the threats are not new. Definitively this cases marks a before and
after in relation to cybersecurity issues. However, the cases presented in this chapter
show that the maritime industry knows well about the contingency plan for physical
disaster. Nevertheless, what about respective to the cyber world area?. One of the
interesting thing for concluding, it is that compromising the vessel can compromise as
well the land-based system and Vis a Vis. For that reason, the maritime industry needs
to continue work hard with the all the stakeholder involved in the sector, to achieve
where we want to be in a near future in term of cyber security.
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V.

CYBER SECURITY MITIGATION GUIDANCE AND CURRENT
PRACTICES EVALUATION.

5.1 Guidelines

The shipping industry is developing day by day, with a notable worldwide role as the
most efficient and cost-effective mode of transportation in international trade,
involving both land and sea operations (Rosenbloom & Goldman, 1998). During the
history of the maritime transportation industry, many accidents and incidents have
resulted in dramatic loss of human lives, severe damage to the environment and
significant monetary loss. For that reason, the industry has been subject for the
development of many regulatory frameworks, and the new hot topic on cybersecurity
issues is not the exception.
In this chapter, a brief summary will be presented of the Guidelines on the facilitation
aspect of protecting the maritime transport network from cyber-attacks, given by the
International Maritime Organization, and different guidelines on cyber security
offered by different members of the maritime industry. Each of these guidelines brings
to the sector an important standpoint in relation to cyber security issues, not for the
technical and procedural discussion, but more for the fact that these guidelines directly
influence the maritime industry to take the necessary actions against cyber threats and
increase cyber awareness. At the time of this research, there are no mandatory
regulations established, given that cybersecurity is a relatively new area of study
(Foote, 2017).
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5.1.1 International Maritime Organization
The International Maritime Organization is a United Nations (UN) specialized agency.
It facilitates cooperation and information exchange among governments, wherein the
mission is to promote safe, secure, environmentally sound and sustainable shipping,
through effective review, development, implementation and compliance with IMO’s
instruments (IMO, 2017). In the last 60 years, the organization has adopted 59
conventions and protocols and more than 1,000 codes and recommendations,
representing without a doubt, that it is the only way to regulate such a complex
international industry as shipping (Basaran, 2016). As a sign of this, in June 2016,
IMO through the Maritime Safety Committee, released the publication of the “Interim
Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management”, the main objective of which is to
create awareness of the cyber awareness threat and vulnerabilities existing in the
maritime sector.
The IMO guidelines are designed to provide a general overview and recommendations
for cyber risk matters, focusing on risk management approach, and their incorporation
by the stakeholder, which involve of digitalization, integration and automation that by
different latent threat and vulnerabilities, can lead to circumstances and event
compromising the safety, the secure and the operation of the shipping system.
This guideline refers to the BIMCO guidelines and the National Institute of Standards
and Technology Framework (NIST), with the objective of creating a cyber-risk
awareness culture at all organisational levels. The IMO guidelines include five
elements that are presented in the NIST framework as well, which are identify, protect,
detect, respond and recover. Identify, as the first element, shows that all systems, and
personnel roles and responsibilities connected to cybersecurity should be identified. In
the Protect element, the aim is to implement risk control measures, processes and
contingency planning, concentrating effort on ensuring continuity of shipping
operations. In the final three elements, the IMO focuses on the development and
implementation process in terms of detecting, responding and recovering in case of a
cyber-incident on shipping operations.
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5.1.2 Maritime Industry Actors within BIMCO
The Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) and other influential
maritime associations, in February 2016, released “the Guidelines on Cyber Security
Onboard Ships”, designed for ship-owners and operators. The Guidelines provide
assistance in assessment operations and on the implementation of actions and
procedures related to preserving cybersecurity onboard vessels. This guideline is
exclusively appointed to cybersecurity matters onboard vessels, with the aim of
increasing cybersecurity awareness and recognizing cyber security good practice as a
preventive measure against cyber-attacks in the maritime industry. According to the
content of the BIMCO guideline, this includes six important cyber awareness steps:
identify threats, identify vulnerabilities, assess risk exposure, develop protection and
detection measures, establish contingency plans, and respond to and recover from a
cybersecurity incident. Each maritime organization needs to identify the threats
(internal and external), the threat possibilities and the vulnerabilities, regarding the
specific risk system according to the company, trade, service or vessel operations they
provide. They should understand the actual protective measures put in place, along
with their capabilities and limitations.
The guideline emphasizes that the maritime industry involves many features and
stakeholders, both on land and at sea, which are potentially susceptible to cyber threats.
Several of the systems are related directly to safety and environmental protection.
Furthermore, this guideline suggests that maritime companies and organizations
should carry out an internal risk assessment to identify risk, potential threat and survey
of the actual systems and procedures established, followed up by a third-party
assessment. One of the most critical steps in the cyber awareness cycle, presented in
the BIMCO guideline, is the development of protection and detention measures, which
suggest that ship-owners and operators focus on technical defenses (ensuring the
design and configuration of the onboard vessel system are resilient to cyber-attacks),
and procedural defenses (covering safety and security company policy and procedures,
and control of the cyber vulnerabilities). Additionally, personnel involved in ship
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operations must be trained and adequately qualified. Finally, companies are
encouraged to establish and maintain a contingency plan, in order to respond
immediately and appropriately to cyber incidents and implement the measures
developed by the company (Foote, 2017)
5.1.3 American Bureau of Shipping
The internationally recognized classification society, American Bureau of Shipping
(ABS), issued a detailed series of five cyber safety guidance notes, in relation to cyber
security issues. Of specific interest is “The Application Of Cybersecurity Principles
To Marine And Offshore Operation”, which was published in February 2016 It has the
intention to provide the members of the marine and offshore sector with the
recommendations and best practices required to build and maintain cybersecurity
programs. The volume contains five section. The first and second sections show a
general overview of cybersecurity and present advice on cybersecurity programs. The
following three sections cover the marine and offshore operations’ best practices and
cybersecurity principles, where ABS promotes the implementation of the nine
capabilities set for cybersecurity programs.
In September 2016, two more volumes were published, which establish standards for
companies that operate offshore units and vessels on the prevention of cyber incidents
that compromise the safety and security of their operations. Additionally, they refer to
the verification and survey of the organizational process, as well as the carrying out
audits and issue of certification, according to with the parameters provided in the
guideline. Volume three concentrates on data analysis and sources, specifically data
integrity concepts, which are divided into three main categories: characterising,
securing and maintaining data integrity for marine and offshore operations.
Volume four and five are the Guide for Software System Verification and the Guide
for Integrated Software Quality Management (ISQM), respectively. Volume four
focuses on the computer control system onboard of the vessel and offshore assets,
presetting diverse procedures for the verification of software and recommending that
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this verification be carried out by the third party. The last volume, ISQM, is designed
for managers, quality personnel and software developers, focusing on a software
provider conformity program, with the intention of providing help in the improvement
of the quality of software programs by the practices described in the volume.
5.1.4 Det Norske Veritas
Det Norske Veritas (DNV GL) is a maritime company that provides, in diverse fields,
an advisor expertise service, with the objective of the protection of human life,
environment and property. In September 2016, DNV GL addressed the issues and
challenges faced by the maritime industry in relation to cyber security incidents with
the publication of “Cyber Security Resilience Management for Ships and Mobile
Offshore Units in Operation”. This Recommended Practice for cybersecurity risk
assessment provides a clear understanding of threats, vulnerabilities, possible
consequences and barriers, related to integration, digitalization and automation of
systems and processes (see figure 9), for the implementation and verification of the
maritime and offshore industry (DNV GL, 2016).

Figure 9. System onboard vessel and connection to shore. Source: DNV GL
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In addition, in June 2018, a paper on cybersecurity by design, “A proposed approach
applied to modern cruise ship newbuilding”, was published. This twelve-page
document is intended explicitly for modern and smart cruise vessels, which require
technology for operational vessel efficiency and passenger experience. This document
implicates the participation of cruise operator, shipbuilding yards and marine cyber
systems as stakeholders involved in the delivery process of these types of vessels
(DNV GL, 2018).
5.1.5 Maritime Industry (Lloyd´S)
Cybersecurity is on the agenda of many companies involved in the maritime
operational sector. As another example, Lloyd´s register, in February 2016, issued a
new guidance, “Cyber-enabled Ship, Deploying information and communication
technology in shipping- Lloyd´s register approach to assurance”, for a better
understanding of the implications of technological systems. The guidance provides
advice to different stakeholders in terms of cybersecurity matters. It contains three
sections. Section two describes six specific areas of cyber risk that need to be
addressed for the safety and dependability of the different interconnected systems
involved in the shipping operations: system, human-system-software network and
communication, data assurance and cybersecurity (Lloyd´s, 2016).
On December 2017, version 2.0 of Cyber-enabled ship, was published with the title
“ShipRight procedure assignment for descriptive cyber notes for autonomous &
remote access ship”, Lloyd´s register guidance document. This document is designed
for vessels classed by Lloyd’s Register, with the purpose of assessing systems installed
onboard that are manipulated by crew but can be monitored and controlled remotely
or autonomously as well. For that reason, the risk-based approach needs to consider
the variation that this system brings to the table, and which is discussed in this version
(Lloyd´s, 2017).
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5.2 Present Risk Mitigation Analysis
Questionnaire for shipping companies and Maritime Administrations.
A questionnaire related to cybersecurity issues was sent to different maritime
administrations and shipping companies, with the aim of obtaining current information
on the actions and preventive measures adopted today. As mentioned in the limitation
section, many shipping companies and maritime administrations refused to participate
in this survey because they consider that the subject matter is a sensitive topic to
discuss. However, regarding the answers received, it can be concluded that:
1.

The vast majority of those surveyed agreed that security and cybersecurity is a

very serious topic, which can not only affect the safety of shipping operations, but
also the safety of the employees and the personnel involved in each activity.
2.

Most of the companies and maritime administrations claim that they take into

consideration the necessary measures to address this critical issue, mentioning that the
IT system protection, cybersecurity awareness, contingency measures and training of
the personnel are considered in the internal procedures of the companies and
administrations.
3. The responses show that each company and maritime administration has different
ways of classifying cyber risk. This is due to the fact that each company and
administration has its portfolio of the services, and in the relation to that, the
classification has different variables.
4.

The survey also revealed that some of the companies and the maritime

administration have experienced small cyber incidents, such as network trouble,
application error, phishing attempts, malicious emails and other minor incidents.
5. The responses show that no major incident has been recorded, and no major losses,
as a consequence of cyber-attacks have been faced.
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6. No safety, environmental or economic effects as a result of cyber-attack, has been
confronted. The survey highlights that the risk of cyber-attack is very high and could
have severe consequences in the maritime industry.
7.

The study demonstrated the concern of the shipping companies and maritime

administration in terms of insurance, considering that the insurance companies need to
take into consideration cyber-attacks and their consequences to provide adequate
coverage.
8. The survey also revealed that cyber-attacks have many types of possible outcomes,
which is one of the primary challenges. However, the fast evolution and influence of
the industry means that more insurance companies carry out studies in this regard, and
include cyber-attacks in their insurance services.
9.

The shipping companies and maritime administration surveyed implement cyber

threat identification, security manuals and technical training as established preventive
measures.
10.

It is considered by the respondents that a new regulation is required, taking into

consideration that technological systems and equipment are continually evolving, so
new revisions and new measures need to be considered to maintain up-to-date
regulations related to cybersecurity.
11.

It is noted that each shipping company and the maritime administration have

dedicated personnel and security officers responsible for handling cybersecurity
issues. However, they highlight that security is everyone´s responsibility and the most
optimal way to address these issues is with education and training.
12.

The survey revealed that a response plan has been put in place by the shipping

companies and maritime administration surveyed.
13.

The majority of those surveyed mention that training courses are necessary and

many of them already put in practice these courses for shore-based and seagoing
personnel, to keep up-to-date, understand the risks and vulnerabilities, and reduce the
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possibilities of cyber-attacks. Nevertheless, training is not enough. It is necessary to
take into consideration exercises and practices to ensure that the personnel is aware of
the issues and that the course will not just be a box ticking exercise.

5.3 Barriers for Cyber Security Implementation
In this section, the most significant barriers are identified and presented below, in
terms of implementation of cyber security measures.

COST OR LACK OF RESOURCES

IGNORANCE AND IGNORING

CONTROL AND MONITORING

5.3.1 Cost or Lack of Resources
The cost of cyber security measures represents a substantial financial loss for the
company. However, this section highlights that a cyber-attack will cost more in the
end than if preventive measures were taken in the first place. For many companies, the
financial limitation and the lack of resources is a big issue. The budget that is
designated for security matters is limited, which is ironic because the security of the
system that controls all the operations of the company should be a priority. However,
it is understandable that for many small companies investing in cybersecurity will
represent a great economic challenge, but it is necessary to prioritize spending on cyber
security measures. The main considerations should be investment in cybersecurity
training and awareness, cybersecurity controls, antivirus, operational system measures
and an insurance that covers cybernetic attacks (Schweigert, 2017). Nevertheless,
according to Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society (HIMSS)
Cyber security survey 2018, allocation of cyber security resources was a business
priority for companies in the last year.
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5.3.2 Ignorance and Ignoring
Firstly, ignorance relates to people that do not know about the matter. They lack
knowledge of the security measures most applicable to their systems, and the different
packages available. . They do not know if they are investing in something really safe
or if they are being scammed. It is for that reason that it is necessary that the companies
have a qualified person that can ensure the cybersecurity conditions of the company
and feel sure that the investments they are making will be worth it. However, there is
another aspect to discuss and it is ignoring. This is mostly related to the Ostrich
Algorithm, which is a strategy of putting your head in the sand and ignoring potential
problems. This is basically the action of many companies that know that there is an
issue requiring prompt decision, but prefer to ignore it and act like there is nothing
happening. This attitude represents a very high risk for them, their customers, their
partners and the stakeholders involved in the service that the company provides
(Schweigert, 2017).
5.3.3 Control and Monitoring
In order to apply effective control and monitoring in terms of cyber security, it is
essential, firstly, to determine cyber security priorities, to move ahead for compliance,
and to define the best practices that need to be implemented. When this is set up, it is
necessary to maintain a control and monitoring of the system and operations that are
related with interconnectivity and network (Whitterker, 2016). Additionally, it is
essential to have appropriate cybersecurity personnel, which according to the HIMSS
survey 2018, represent the most significant barriers for remediating and mitigating
cybersecurity incidents. For that reason, the training and qualification of personnel (see
chapter VI Recommendations) has become a key supporting element to consider, not
only for control and monitoring aspects, but as a safeguard for the company and
personal security (BIMCO, 2016).
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5.4

Concluding Thoughts

As it is presented in the previous chapter, the cyber-attacks can result in loss of
communication, information, data, navigation, propulsion, time, cargo, casualties,
business disruption and losses as an example. However, the guidelines discussed focus
in the vessel, mobile offshore units, marine and offshore operation and vessel manager
perspective. Nevertheless, it is essential that the shipping company, follow the
guideline mentioned in term of understand the threats, risks, vulnerability and possible
consequence that each system and equipment related to vessel operation can have,
highlighting that for 2021 will be included in the International Safety Management
Code (ISM Code), which will be a regulatory framework for cyber risk assessment,
and for 2022 audit and Port State control Inspection will be carried out to verify their
compliance.
On the other hand, port, shipping companies and maritime administration need to take
the necessary preventive measure and action to reduce the probabilities of being cyberattacks, emphasizing that any system and equipment connected to internet is 100%
secure, there is always the possibility to be cyberattacked, but the preventive measures
as a real risk assessment, company security policy, education and training, contingency
plan, etc., can reduce significantly the probabilities of being cyber attacked or reducing
the consequences.
The barriers analysed in this chapter demonstrate that the companies can present some
difficulties in term of implementation, for that reason the barrier discussed in this
chapter need to be taking into consideration for the shipping industry. Therefore, the
question that came to my mind is, if the shipping companies did not take the
appropriated cybersecurity measures, for how long the companies, port, vessel and
maritime administration can survive, after a sever cyber-attack.
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VI.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

6.1 Discussion of Findings
According to all the previous chapters, the maritime industry is clearly vulnerable to
cyber-attacks. Today, shipping companies, vessels, ports and maritime administrations
have various modern electronic systems, facilitating profit and conduct of their daily
operations. However, this technology, if it is not used adequately and along with the
proper security measures, could have serious repercussions. There is a lack of
understanding within the maritime industry of what cyber-attacks really mean and the
consequences followings these incidents.
It is necessary to understand that the risks that the maritime industry is facing in terms
of cyber security are real. For that reason, it is necessary that the management team
engages in the cyber security issues explained in the recommendation section because
a cyber-attack is an organizational problem, not just related to the IT department.
These issues can directly affect the whole organizational structure and enterprise
operation.
It is also important to carry out an evaluation of the best practices and an assessment
of the systems, equipment and products, that will be used by shipping companies,
ports, vessels, maritime administrations before investing in a new technological
system or equipment. This will help to verify whether or not this modern technology
represents a risk to the company, society, environment and individuals. Nevertheless,
the future of cyber-attacks in the maritime industry is difficult to predict; the time to
act is now
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6.2 Conclusions
In the new digital era of the maritime industry, where information and communication
technology play an imperative role, systems will be more interconnected, remote
controlled, network dependent and possibly autonomous. The market has been
transformed from the traditional concepts used during previous centuries. The new
technologically advanced systems that are present in the modern shipping industry
facilitate efficient operation, but at the same time represent specific vulnerabilities for
the different systems, which can result in catastrophic scenarios.
In conclusion, there is no doubt that today the maritime sector is safer, secure,
environmentally friendly and energy efficient, compared with previous decades, and
it is evident that it is not lacking in international regulatory frameworks, representing
an absolute advantage as a transportation mode (IMO, 2017). However, the constant
evolution of the shipping industry, the manifestation of new technology and other
contemporary challenges make it eminent to elaborate a long-term plan. This need is
reflected in the United Nations’ and IMO’s proactive agenda, with an influential
position to achieve the sustainable development goals (UNEP, 2013).
The cyber security issue is strongly affecting the maritime industry. Since the
beginning, it has been necessary to have the collaboration and participation of the all
the stakeholders involved in the shipping industry, but the issue is that, due to the
sensitive nature of the subject matter, it is difficult to collect more data to carry out a
more in depth investigation. Further investigation needs to be carried out to continue
showing the importance of the cyber-attacks affecting the maritime industry and the
future difficulties that will be presented in the sector. Nevertheless, the participation
of the shipping industry is necessary to contribute to creating better operational
conditions, implementing and enforcing national regulations and contributing to the
stability and prosperity of maritime trade. This will help to ensure that the maritime
industry continues to play a vital role in the world economy, and will ensure better
future conditions for the new generations. (IMO, 2017). For that reason, it is important
that regulatory organisations, shipping companies, vessels, ports and facilities keep
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working on the development of cybersecurity protection measures to safeguard
intellectual property, vessels, ports and facilities from cyber threats.
6.3 Limitations
The limitation presented during the development of this research was in terms of the
collection of data and feedback from the questionnaire. It has been observed that
information, procedures, and implementation regarding cyber-attacks are confidential
to many shipping companies, ship owners and flag administrations. Additionally, there
is an inclination in the sector to keep cyber incidents secret, with the fear of being
exposed to more cyber-attacks, resulting in loss of reputation and negative business
consequences.
6.4 Recommendations
The maritime industry in the last years has taken significant steps concerning
developing guidelines and recommendations to address cybersecurity issues.
However, it is evident that with the continued grow and demand for technological
systems and equipment used in daily shipping operations, there is a necessity for the
industry and government to continually develop and implement strong measures and
take the necessary actions to focus on cybersecurity. The following recommendation
aims to present an alternative to promote and increase policy, procedures, training and
culture in terms of cybersecurity in the maritime sector (See figure 10).

Figure 10. Recommendations. Source: Author
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6.4.1 Promote Cybersecurity Policy and Procedures
The promotion and implementation of the cybersecurity policy and procedures is
essential for the maritime sector against cyber-attacks. It is indispensable that the
policy and procedures developed and implemented for the maritime companies include
safety and security strategy, scope, goals, risk assessment, responsibilities and roles,
operational procedures, training and awareness, security and safety requirements,
operational security, incident management and a recovery plan.
Cybersecurity insurance needs to be considered as a contingency plan taken by
shipping companies, ports, maritime facilities, and other business infrastructures
involved in maritime operations. It is necessary that the maritime business review
policies to verify which aspects of cybersecurity incidents and losses are covered by
insurance, including user training and education, network security, malware
protection, security configuration, monitoring process and incident management.
6.4.2 Promote a Cybersecurity Risk Aware Culture
According to a relevant cyberkeel report, the human element involved in maritime
operations is the most vulnerable one in terms of cybersecurity. For that reason, it is
necessary to develop a training strategy on cyber security awareness for employees.
Shipping companies, governments, port facilities, ship-owners and operators, as the
main stakeholders involved in shipping operations, need to develop a culture of cyber
risk awareness at all operational and technical levels.
For the promotion of a cybersecurity risk aware culture, it is indispensable that the
management level of companies take the necessary actions against cyberattacks,
promoting education and training of all personnel that has access to a sensitive system,
raising awareness of cyber threats and vulnerabilities. As a result of these actions, a
total organizational cybersecurity culture will be created.
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6.4.3 Promote Sharing Information among Maritime Industry
In order to manage cyber security issues, information sharing is a crucial factor to take
into consideration. In general, shipping companies, vessels, ports and maritime
administrations face many common threats daily. However, facilitation of information
sharing is vital to help other companies in the maritime industry to better understand
the current panorama and take proactive actions immediately. As is presented in the
limitations section of this dissertation, one of the difficulties presented during the
development of this research is that many shipping companies, ports and maritime
administrations prefer to keep cyber incidents confidential. This is for fear of repeated
cyber-attacks, and/or for prevention of reputational effects.
Another important factor that should be considered is cyber threats reporting, as is the
case of the United State Coast Guard, which, in 2016, issued a “reporting cyber-attacks
and suspicious activities” policy, where the vessels and marine facilities are required
to report to NRC any of the abovementioned scenarios. The reporting of cyber
incidents can be beneficial when a study and analysis is carried out with the aim of
provided clear recommendations that can be shared throughout the sector to help avoid
future incidents.
6.4.4 Promote Tailored Training And Awareness.
The normal functioning of the shipping industry is based on human interaction,
qualification and knowledge. As a result, maritime education and training play an
essential role in the development of the sector. Firstly, education is a primary part of
the seafarer’s life. Having well-educated and trained seafarers can reduce many risks,
such as those related to shipping, cargo, and navigational operations that are presented
in the seafarers’ daily life.
Talking about the cybersecurity issues, vulnerability, risks and consequences
previously presented, The International Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) should be considered. Currently, there is
almost nothing relating to cybersecurity education and training for seafarers and
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especially for deck officers. To address the issues related to cybersecurity onboard
vessels, it is necessary that IMO take into consideration the development of training
courses for seafarers and deck officers, specifically in cybersecurity topics to educate
seafarers in the correct use of technology onboard vessels and introduce the risks that
the vessel system and equipment may have in terms of disruption.
Notwithstanding, shipping operations are just a small part of the interconnected
maritime industry. Shipping companies, ports and maritime administrations need to
take the necessary measures in relation to training of personnel that work directly with
sensitive systems and information that can be jeopardized by cyber-attacks. An internal
training plan on cybersecurity, which can include the risk of using e-mail, internet,
personal devices, removable media, and passwords, as well as awareness of data
practices, installing and maintaining software, suspicious activities, quick response
and contingency planning, and impacts and consequences needs to be developed with
the aim of promoting awareness on the use of technological systems.
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VII.
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APPENDIX SECTION
Appendix 1: Definitions
1. Botnets: According to Techtarget a bonnets can be defined as a collection of
internet-connected devices, which may include PCs, servers, mobile devices and
internet of things devices that are infected and controlled by a common type of
malware (Techtarget, 2018).
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2. Bugs: Techopedia define bugs as an error, fault or flaw in any computer program
or a hardware system (Techopedia, 2018).
3. Cybercrime: is the use of computers or related systems to steal or compromise
confidential information for criminal purposes, most often for financial gain
(Katzan, 2012).
4. Cybercriminal: It is define for Tredmicro as, individuals or teams of people who
use technology to commit malicious activities on digital systems or networks with
the intention of stealing sensitive company information or personal data, and
generating profit (Trendmicro, 2018).
5. Cyberespionage: is the use of computers or related systems to collect intelligence
or enable certain operations, whether in cyberspace or the real world (Katzan,
2012).
6. Cyberspace: According to Oxford dictionaries, cyberspace is the notional
environment in which communication over computer networks occurs (Oxford
dictionaries, 2018).
7. Cyberterrorism: is the use of computers or related systems to create fear or panic
in a society and may not result in physical destruction by cyber agitation (Katzan,
2012).
8. Cyberwar: consists of military operations conducted within cyberspace to deny an
adversary, whether a state or non-state actor, the effective use of information
systems and weapons, or systems controlled by information technology, in order
to achieve a political end (Katzan, 2012).
9. Hacktivist: The Oxford dictionaries define hacktivist as a person who gains
unauthorized access to computer files or networks in order to further social or
political ends (Oxforddictionaries, 2018).
10. Insider attacks: According to Techopedia, an insider attack is a malicious attack
perpetrated on a network or computer system by a person with authorized system
access (Techopedia, 2018).
11. Jamming: is the (usually deliberate) transmission of radio signals that disrupt
communications by decreasing the signal-to-noise ratio, resulting in the loss of the
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link´s reliability, increased energy consumption, extended packet delay, and
disruption of the end-to-end routes (Guirguis, 2012).
12. Phishing: refers to the process of deceiving recipients into sharing sensitive
information with a third-party (BIMCO, 2016).
13. Ransomware: Ransomware is defined by techopedia as a type of malware program
that infects, locks or takes control of a system and demands ransom to undo it.
Ransomware attacks and infects a computer with the intention of extorting money
from its owner (Techopedia, 2018).
14. Spoofing: Techopedia define spoofing in general, as a fraudulent or malicious
practice in which communication is sent from an unknown source disguised as a
source known to the receiver. Spoofing is most prevalent in communication
mechanisms that lack a high level of security (Techopedia, 2018).
15. Spyware: According technopedia Spyware is infiltration software that secretly
monitors unsuspecting users. It can enable a hacker to obtain sensitive information,
such as passwords, from the user's computer. Spyware exploits user and
application vulnerabilities and is often attached to free online software downloads
or to links that are clicked by users (Techopedia, 2018).

Appendix 2: Electronic magazine survey
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Marca temporal
2018/09/07 3:26:14 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 3:51:18 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 3:57:36 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 3:59:03 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 4:00:07 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 4:04:08 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 4:08:19 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 4:09:36 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 4:11:05 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 4:14:37 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 4:18:22 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 4:19:39 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 4:21:44 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 4:24:40 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 4:26:07 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 4:28:58 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 4:29:58 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 4:33:15 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 4:37:27 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 4:43:07 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 4:44:23 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 4:45:24 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 4:46:03 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 4:46:24 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 4:46:51 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 4:48:42 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 4:54:58 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 5:01:56 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 5:03:30 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 5:05:13 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 5:07:18 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 5:17:18 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 5:21:28 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 5:24:30 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 5:25:20 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 5:27:45 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 5:28:20 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 5:29:08 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 5:31:18 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 5:36:33 p.m. GMT+2

Which of the following electronic maritime How often do you read
magazines do you know?
any of this magazines?
Lloyd List;Fair Play
Once a month
LloydÂ´s List
Once a week
LloydÂ´s List;Tradewinds
Once a week
LloydÂ´s List;Digital Ship;Fair Play
Once a week
LloydÂ´s List;Digital Ship;Tradewinds;Fair Play
Once a week
LloydÂ´s List
Once a month
LloydÂ´s List;Tradewinds
Once a month
LloydÂ´s List;Fair Play
Once a month
Digital Ship
Once a month
LloydÂ´s List;Tradewinds;Nautilus uk
Once a month
LloydÂ´s List
Once a week
LloydÂ´s List;Tradewinds;Gcaptain,
ClippingNews(Maasmond Maritime)
Once a week
LloydÂ´s List;Tradewinds;Fair Play
Once a month
LloydÂ´s List
Once a month
LloydÂ´s List;Digital Ship
Once a week
LloydÂ´s List
Once a month
LloydÂ´s List;Fair Play
Once a month
LloydÂ´s List;Tradewinds
Once in 2 months
LloydÂ´s List
Once a Year
LloydÂ´s List;Fair Play
Once a week
LloydÂ´s List
Once a Year
LloydÂ´s List
Once a month
LloydÂ´s List;BIMCO, DNV GL
Once a week
LloydÂ´s List
Every day
LloydÂ´s List;Fair Play
Once in 6 months
LloydÂ´s List;Maritime Executive
Once a month
LloydÂ´s List
Four times year
LloydÂ´s List
Once a month
LloydÂ´s List;Bimco
Once a Year
LloydÂ´s List
LloydÂ´s List;Tradewinds;Fair Play
Once a week
LloydÂ´s List;Fair Play
Once a week
LloydÂ´s List;Digital Ship
Once a month
LloydÂ´s List
Once a month
LloydÂ´s List;Tradewinds
Once a week
LloydÂ´s List;Fair Play
Once a month
It depends with the
LloydÂ´s List;Tradewinds
contents
LloydÂ´s List;Fair Play
Once a month
LloydÂ´s List;full avante news
Once a week
WorldÂ´s Maritime News
Once a week
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2018/09/07 5:38:21 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 5:42:36 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 6:16:01 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 6:33:04 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 6:33:07 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 8:30:26 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 8:35:05 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/07 9:56:57 p.m. GMT+2

LloydÂ´s List
LloydÂ´s List
LloydÂ´s List;Digital Ship;Tradewinds;Fair Play
LloydÂ´s List
LloydÂ´s List;Fair Play
LloydÂ´s List;Fair Play
LloydÂ´s List;Fair Play
LloydÂ´s List;Digital Ship;Navigator

2018/09/07 11:50:55 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/08 1:54:00 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/10 8:48:31 p.m. GMT+2
2018/09/12 1:07:38 a.m. GMT+2
2018/09/12 8:24:37 p.m. GMT+2

LloydÂ´s List;Fair Play
LloydÂ´s List
LloydÂ´s List;Tradewinds;Fair Play
LloydÂ´s List;Fair Play
LloydÂ´s List

Once a month
Once a month
Once a month
Once a month
Once a week
Once a week
Once a Year
not regular
Sometimes not regular
reading
5 times a week
Once a week
Once a week
Once a month
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Appendix 3: Electronic Magazine Collection of Data
Digital Ship Magazines:
Edition 104 December 2014 page 17.
Edition 124 August 2017 page 35
Edition 124 August 2017 page 3
Edition 125 October 2017 page 3
Edition 126 November 2017 page 33
Edition 128 February 2018 page 12
Edition 129 April 2018 page 14
Edition 130 June 2018 page 2018
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Fairplay Magazines:
20 July 2017. Vol 389. Issue 6909, page 6
27 September 2017. Vol 389. Issue 6914, page 8
23 November 2017. Vol 389. Issue 6918, page 18
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Lloyd´s List Magazines:
7 June 2017
28 June 2017
7 July 2017
14 July 2017
16 August 2017
16 October 2017
7 November 2017
29 November 2017
21 March 2018
20 July 2018
25 July 2018
27 July 2018
30 July 2018
31 July 2018
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Tradewinds Magazines:
06 July 2017
27July 2017
28 July 2017
16 October 2017
29 November 2017
09 February 2018
25 July 2018
30 July 2018
31 July 2018
08 March 2018
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